Eight Arguments against Double Effect
Publikation: Konferencebidrag › Paper › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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Eight Arguments against Double Effect. / Di Nucci, Ezio.
2014. Paper præsenteret ved Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Münster, Tyskland.Publikation: Konferencebidrag › Paper › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - CONF
T1 - Eight Arguments against Double Effect
AU - Di Nucci, Ezio
N1 - Conference code: XXIII.
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.
AB - I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.
M3 - Paper
Y2 - 28 September 2014 through 2 October 2014
ER -
ID: 138971638